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DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
PosrTVE ORDER AND DEVIATION IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CASES

Decedent was regularly employed by G as a truck driver. He left G's loading dock to deliver some goods to a customer two and one-half miles away. D
was accompanied by C and R, part-time employees of G, but neither was on
duty that night. D was at the wheel. When within a short distance from the
destination, instead of following the direct route, D took another road and drove
to a bar where he and R had a few drinks. Upon leaving the bar, D permitted
R to drive. The goods were then delivered. On the return trip, with R still
driving, the route taken was the same as formerly followed. Traveling about
thirty-five miles an hour, the truck reached a point on the direct route where there
was a short turn through a railroad underpass. D said to R, "You're going. too
fast, slow up." R failed to negotiate the turn and the truck crashed into an abutment. D sustained fatal injuries. The widow and two children of D seek an
award of compensation. The insurance carrier asserts that the claimant is not
entitled to an award for the following reasons: (1) D violated specific orders of
the employer which forbade use of intoxicating liquors while on duty and carrying passengers on the truck; (2) the deviation of one-half mile to the bar removed D from the course of his employment at the time of the accident; and (3)
in permitting R to drive the truck, D took himself out of his employment and
became a trespasser and a stranger. The Workmen's Compensation Board allowed an award to the claimant. The lower court ruled against G on the first two
contentions but upheld the third and reversed th-e Board. On appeal to the Superior Court, the lower court was reversed and an award allowed in an opinion by
Baldrige, J., with Rhodes, J., dissenting. Held: Violation by an employee of positive orders of the employer does not prohibit compensation where his duties are
so connected with the act that caused the injury, that he is not outside the scope
of his employment and not in the position of a stranger or a trespasser. Where
the employee permits another to drive in violation of positive orders, but remains
alongside the driver, he is in sufficient control of the truck to remain within the
scope of his employment. Ginther v. 1. P. Graham Transfer Co., 149 Pa. Super.
635, 27 A. (2d) 712 (1942).

The first two contentions of the appellee, the violation of positive orders
which forbade the use of intoxicants by employees while on duty and carrying of

passengers on the truck, and the employee's deviation of one-half mile from the
direct route, are without merit according to prior Pennsylvania cases. The earlier
cases have held that violation of positive orders does not bar recovery, if the acci-

dent occurred at the place where the employee's presence is ordinarily required
and in the course of his employment, and not while in performance of an act wholly
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foreign to his duties. Karchut v. Helvetia Coal Mining Co., 110 Pa. Super 200,
168 A. 375 (1933); Barhanich v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 105 Pa. Super. 145,
160 A. 137 (1932).
In the instant case, at the time the accident occurred, the truck was on that
part of the highway where it would have been even if D had not deviated the onehalf mile to the bar. D re-entered the scope of his employment after this deviation by returning to the highway which was the direct route from G's place of
business to the place of business of the customer. Consequently, since the deviation had been discontinued at the time of the accident, that in itself was no bar
to compensation. Webb. v. North Side Amusement Co., 298 Pa. 58, 147 A. 846
(1929).
As regards the drinking and passenger violations, although these were violations of positive orders, the violations did not bring D into place where his employment did not call him and did not involve the use of an instrumentality
which was foreign to his employment and which he was forbidden to use at the
time the accident occurred. Lewis v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 113 Pa.
Super. 540, 173 A. 859 (1934); Walker v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 99 Pa. Super.
518 (1930).
Under these authorities the Superior Court was fully justifiled in refusing to
uphold the appellee's contentions on these matters.
It is the appellee's contention, that D removed himself from the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident by permitting an unauthorized person to
drive the truck, that gives rise to a very close question. It was on the ruling of
this matter that the upper and lower courts disagreed.
This was the first time the particular factual situation had come before the
courts of Pennsylvania. Indeed the question has been decided only a very few
times in the country, as a search of the authorities has revealed. In Morris & Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill. 49, 128 N. E. 727 (1920) and in Utah Copper
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 62 Utah 33, 217 P. 1105 (1923) (cases not cited by
the court) compensation was not allowed the 'employee who, under these circumstances, was not considered within the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident. In the Illinois case, B, a truck driver, permitted another employee, who
was not authorized, to drive the truck to the garage. B was seated at his side. On
the way B fell from the seat and was killed. The court held the claimant was not
entitled to an award since the accident did not arise out of the employment, since
B was not engaged therein when it occurred. In the Utah case, S, a brakeman on
a mining train, in order to secure relief from inclement weather, changed places
with the fireman. S was killed when the train became involved in a collision.
The claimant was allowed no compensation, since the court found S was outside
the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. These cases represent
the negative side of the question.
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On the other hand, Minnesota and California represent the other view. In
Byam v. Inter-State Iron Co., 190 Minn. 132, 250 N. W. 812 (1933), the driver
of a truck permitted a helper, not authorized to drive, to do so. The former was
injured and was allowed to receive compensation on the grounds that he was
still in the scope of his employment when injured. In Kopp v. Bituminous Surfact Treating Co., 129 Minn. 158, 228 N. W. 559 (1930), the employee, a
truck driver, fell from the running board after allowing a fifteen year old boy
to drive. The court said, "The driver did not abandon his employment when he
permitted another to drive while he was in the vehicle and had control thereof."
In Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
36 Cal. App. 568, 177 P. 171 (1918), under similar circumstances it was held by
a divided court that the claimant remained in the course of his employment.
In Pennsylvania, the Superior Court had no precedent to guide its decision.
Two prior cases allowing recovery closely approach the situation represented in the
instant case. There are facts in each, however, which make them distinguishable
from the case at hand. In Siglin v. Armour & Co., 261 Pa. 30, 103 A. 991
(1918), the helper, not the driver, on a truck gave his seat to two girls picked
up at his instance and in violation of positive orders. The helper fell from the
running board and was injured. The Supreme Court in allowing an award of
compensation said, "Had he suffered an injury while on the ground for the purpose of taking on passengers, a different question would be presented. But having resumed his appointed journey, he was no doubt in thv course of his employment thereafter, no matter in what part of the truck he placed himself." This
case is cited by Judge Baldrige in the course of his opinion as the case "closest to
paralleling the facts under discussion." It may be distinguished, however, by the
fact that the driver did not give up his position but rather it was the helper,
whose job involved no particular position in the truck, who gave up his seat and
was injured. Nevertheless the court emphasized the fact that he remained on the
truck in arriving at the conclusion that he was in the scope of his employment
when the accident occurred. Another case, Matzek v. United Storage and Trucking Co., 122 Pa. Super. 146, 186 A. 193 (1936), not mentioned by the Superior
Court in the opinion, closely approaches the instant case. There M, a truck driver, became ill while driving and asked a companion, whom he had taken along
in violation of a positive order, to drive. M had been told to call the home office
if the truck broke down but had not been told what he should do if he should become ill. Emphasizing the fact that the evidence showed no violation of positive
order in permitting another to drive and the fact of an emergency, the court allowed an award to the claimant who was injured. In so deciding, the court held
that M had not taken himself out of the scope of his employment at the time the
accident occurred.
With this sparsity of authority and discussion on a very fine question, the
Superior Court adopted the liberal view of the Minnesota and California courts.
The court emphasized the fact that D remained on the seat occupied by the driver
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and watched his manner of driving, even telling him to slow down. The court
said, "It cannot be said that he had forfeited or lost control of the truck . . . If

he had left the truck or was in the fear of it asleep, permitting one, whom he
knew to be incompetent, to drive in his place we would be confronted with a dif-

ferent proposition." It is necessary, in attempting to understand the adoption of
this view, to notice a significant statement made by Judge Baldrige. This statement has been made in sewral Supreme and Superior Court decisions. Pater v.
Superior Steel Co., 263 Pa. 244, 246, 106 A. 202 (1919); Uditsky v. Krakovitz,
133 Pa. Super. 186, 189, 2 A. (2d) 525 (1938); Ottavi v. Timothy Burke Stripping Co., 140 Pa. Super. 389, 395, 14 A. (2d) 188 (1940). The learned judge,
when he began to discuss this question said, "In approaching this question, admittedly a close one, we must keep in mind that Workmen's Compensation, being
remedial legislation, must be given a liberal construction."
S. S. M.

